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Abstract
This paper studies the real eﬀects of an exogenous UK tax change in re-
cessions and expansions. The tax shock is identiﬁed via the measure pro-
posed by Cloyne (2013). Combining local projection techniques (Jordà,
2005) with smooth transition regressions (Granger and Teräsvirta, 1994),
tax policy shock is found to aﬀect UK macroeconomic variables depending
on the phase of the business cycle the economy is when tax shock occurs.
An exogenous tax cut in recessions triggers a large, persistent, positive,
and statistically signiﬁcant reaction in output, consumption, investment,
exports, imports, and government consumption. The results suggest that
the output tax multiplier is positive and above one (in absolute value)
in recessions but not in expansions. The size and the sign of responses of
a number of macroeconomic variables are also found to be state-contingent.
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Non - Technical Summary
The Great Recession has reignited the debate on the size of ﬁscal multipli-
ers. As a result, a growing literature has attempted to quantify the size of
the output tax multiplier to assess how appropriate the ﬁscal intervention
has been. However, there is no consensus about the size and the sign of
reaction of macroeconomic variables to tax changes. Despite the impor-
tance to evaluate whether the eﬀects of a tax shock are asymmetric across
the business cycle, the literature focusing on the nonlinear eﬀects of tax
changes is scant and it focuses mainly on the US economy.
We contribute to the state of art studying whether an unexpected tax
cut in the UK has nonlinear eﬀects on macroeconomic activity over the
business cycle. To overcome the identiﬁcation of tax changes because of
the endogeneity problem between tax revenues and GDP, we proxy the UK
tax shock relying on the measure constructed by Cloyne (2013). To esti-
mate the eﬀects of tax shocks conditionally on the state of economy and
to avoid dealing with some implicit assumptions of the regime-switching
model, we combine the Local Projection estimations with smooth transi-
tion regressions.
We ﬁnd that unexpected tax changes exert asymmetric eﬀects on macroe-
conomic activity depending on the phase of the business cycle the economy
is in when the tax change occurs (recessions versus expansions). In partic-
ular, the position in the business cycle when the shock occurs statistically
aﬀects the sign and the size of the reaction of real variables to tax changes.
In recessions, a tax cut has expansionary eﬀects on GDP and its compo-
nents. We ﬁnd that the peak output multiplier over three-years is around
ﬁve, whereas in expansions is below one and not statistically signiﬁcant.
Disentangling the (nonlinear) eﬀects of taxes on the GDP components
(consumption, investment, imports, exports, and government consump-
tion), we ﬁnd that consumption is the key driver of GDP ﬂuctuation along
the business cycle. We show that the eﬀects of tax shocks are quantita-
tively larger in recessions and smaller in expansions than those predicted
by a linear framework. A linear estimation overshadows the eﬀects of tax
shocks across regimes because it works as an average of the two diﬀerent
eﬀects. Our results are important for a policy standpoint, calling for a
tailored use of ﬁscal policy instruments across the business cycle.
2
1 Introduction
What are the eﬀects of a tax shock in the UK? Are the eﬀects of a tax shock
diﬀerent across the business cycle (recession versus expansion)? How large is the
UK tax multiplier? The Great Recession has reignited the debate on the size
of ﬁscal multipliers. As a result, a growing literature has attempted to quan-
tify the size of the output tax multiplier to assess how appropriate the ﬁscal
intervention has been (i.e., Cloyne, 2013; Mountford and Uhlig, 2009; Romer
and Romer, 2010; Favero and Giavazzi, 2012; Perotti, 2012; Mertens and Ravn,
2014). However, there is no consensus about the size and the sign of reaction of
macroeconomic variables to tax changes. Blanchard and Leigh (2013) highlight
that during the Great Recession the size of ﬁscal multipliers has been underes-
timated. This suggests that the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy tools may vary over time.
This paper contributes to the debate studying whether an unexpected tax cut in
the UK has nonlinear eﬀects on macroeconomic activity over the business cycle.
Fitting the post-WWII UK data and combining local projection techniques
(Jordà, 2005) with smooth transition regressions (Granger and Teräsvirta, 1994),
we ﬁnd that unexpected tax changes exert asymmetric eﬀects on macroeconomic
activity depending on the phase of the business cycle the economy is in when
the tax change occurs (recessions versus expansions). In particular, the position
in the business cycle when the shock occurs statistically aﬀects the sign and
the size of the reaction of real variables to tax changes. In recessions, a tax
cut has expansionary eﬀects on GDP and its components. We quantify that
the peak-level of GDP over three-years is around ﬁve in recessions, whereas it
is below one and not statistically signiﬁcant in expansions. Disentangling the
(nonlinear) eﬀects of taxes on the GDP components (consumption, investment,
imports, exports, and government consumption), we ﬁnd that consumption is the
key driver of GDP ﬂuctuation along the business cycle. We show that the eﬀects
of tax shocks are quantitatively larger in recessions and smaller in expansions
than those predicted by a linear framework.
These results support the empirical evidence that tax policy changes may
generate diﬀerent outcomes across the business cycle. Tagkalakis (2008), analyz-
ing a panel of nineteen OECD countries, ﬁnds that the eﬀects of tax shocks on
private consumption are diﬀerent in recessions and expansions. This asymmetry
can be explained by liquidity constraints of households that can be more severe in
recessions than in expansions. In the presence of binding liquidity constraints on
households, ﬁscal policy may be more eﬀective in stimulating private consump-
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tion in recessions than in expansions. Moreover, Kaplan and Violante (2014)
show that the prevalence of what are known as hand-to-mouth consumers, who
consume all of their income in each period and whose numbers may be expected
to rise in recessions, can generate strong consumption responses to ﬁscal stimu-
lus. Thus, an expansionary ﬁscal policy could have Keynesian (positive) eﬀects
on consumption in downturns of economic activity when liquidity constraints
bind for a larger fraction of the population.
Despite the importance to evaluate whether the eﬀects of a tax shock are
asymmetric across the business cycle, the literature focusing on the nonlinear
eﬀects of tax changes is scant and it focuses mainly on the US economy (i.e.,
Sims and Wolﬀ, 2018; Demirel, 2016; Eskandari, 2019). As for the literature
dealing with nonlinear eﬀects of tax shocks in the UK, one exception is Baum,
Poplawski-Ribeiro, and Weber (2012) which estimate the eﬀects of a tax shock
on output relying on a Threshold VAR. They ﬁnd that the output tax multiplier
is close to zero and not statistically signiﬁcant.1
Two issues make our aim challenging. Firstly, the identiﬁcation of tax changes
because of the endogeneity problem between tax revenues and GDP. For instance,
tax revenues shocks might trigger output ﬂuctuations, while shocks aﬀecting out-
put might cause revenue ﬂuctuations. To overcome the endogeneity problem, two
main approaches have been proposed in the empirical literature. The ﬁrst one,
pioneered by Blanchard and Perotti (2002), relies on structural vector autore-
gressive (SVAR) analysis in which cyclically adjusted tax revenues are used to
proxy tax shocks, and it is based on some assumptions about the implementa-
tion lags in ﬁscal policymaking and on the calibration of the ﬁscal elasticity.2
The second one, the narrative approach proposed by Romer and Romer (2010),
identiﬁes an unexpected tax change analyzing written oﬃcial records and dis-
tinguishing tax shocks due to reasons not related to countercyclical concerns
1Afonso, Baxa, and Slavik (2018) study the nonlinear eﬀects of ﬁscal policy in Germany, Italy,
the UK, and the US. However, using the debt ratio as a proxy for ﬁscal policy shock, they do
not distinguish between revenues and government spending shock.
2In the Blanchard and Perotti (2002) approach a change in tax revenues depend on the auto-
matic response of taxes to output and on exogenous tax changes. To purge the tax revenues
from automatic stabilizers, they calibrate the elasticity of taxes to output via the OECD
method and assumptions proposed by Giorno, Richardson, Roseveare, and van den Noord
(1995) and van den Noord (2002). The elasticity of taxes to output is calibrated combining
the estimation of elasticity of tax revenues to their tax base with the elasticity of tax base
to output. The tax revenues purged by its automatic response to output are the cyclically-
adjusted measure of tax revenues. Then, the calibrated elasticity is used to pin down the
relations linking the reduced form residual to the structural shock in a SVAR framework.
The identiﬁcation of structural shocks is recovered relying on some assumptions about the
implementation lags.
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(exogenous) from those related to them (endogenous).3 Several concerns arise
from the identiﬁcation of tax shocks à la Blanchard and Perotti (2002), because
it may fail to capture tax shifts that are exogenous. For instance, Romer and
Romer (2010) argue that other non-policy movement (i.e., asset and commodity
price ﬂuctuation) may aﬀect the cyclically-adjusted revenues and a SVAR may
not address the correlations between these factors. Caldara and Kamps (2017)
ﬁnd that the eﬀects of tax shocks on output may be very sensitive to the cali-
brated elasticity. Furthermore, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) claim that
the calibrated elasticity may vary across the business cycle. Secondly, Ramey
and Zubairy (2018) raise another issue that may be behind biased results for the
ﬁscal multipliers in SVAR analysis. The estimated size of ﬁscal multipliers may
be very sensitive to the value of ex post conversion factor, i.e. the ratio of the
GDP/ﬁscal variables, used to convert elasticity into multiplier when the model
is estimated including logarithm transformed variables.4
Our analysis jointly tackles these two issues. We estimate a (linear) Structural
VARs identifying the structural tax shock á la Blanchard and Perotti (2002). We
set the elasticity of taxes to output borrowing two coeﬃcient restriction's values
proposed by Perotti (2005) and Cloyne (2013), 0.76 and 1.61, respectively. Then,
we convert elasticities into multipliers using diﬀerent ex post conversion factors.
The results suggest that tax multipliers (in absolute value) increase in the value
of coeﬃcient restrictions (i.e., lower when the coeﬃcient restriction is set to 0.76
and higher when it is equal to 1.61). This result for the UK is in line with the
one found by Caldara and Kamps (2008) for the US. They highlight that the
eﬀects of tax shock will be biased downward whether the calibrated elasticity is
too small. Moreover, estimating two diﬀerent sample sizes (1963:I-2001:II and
1955:I-2009:IV), we ﬁnd that increasing the value of the coeﬃcient restriction
aﬀects the persistence of tax shocks. Furthermore, the combination of identifying
tax shock via coeﬃcient restrictions with ex post conversion factors may lead to
another bias on tax multiplier estimates (see Appendix A for details).
To overcome the tax shock identiﬁcation problem discussed above, we proxy
the UK tax shock relying on the measure constructed via narrative-approach and
3This method has been advocated to identify government spending shocks (see e.g., Ramey and
Shapiro, 1998; V. A. Ramey, 2011), ﬁscal consolidations (see e.g., Devries, Guajardo, Leigh,
and Pescatori, 2011; Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori, 2014), tax shocks in the US (Romer and
Romer, 2010), in Portugal (Pereira and Wemans, 2015), in Germany (Hayo and Uhl, 2014),
and in the UK (Cloyne, 2013).
4The transformation of variables in logarithm form is a common practice in the VAR literature,
but not only. Indeed, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013a) relying on Local Projection
regressions use log-transformed variables.
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proposed by Cloyne (2013), whereas to avoid the ex post conversion factor one
we deﬁne the variables as in Hall (2009) and in Barro and Redlick (2011). To
estimate the eﬀects of tax shocks conditionally on the state of economy and to
avoid dealing with some implicit assumptions of the regime-switching model, we
combine the Local Projection (Jordà, 2005) estimations with smooth transition
regressions (Granger and Teräsvirta, 1994).5
Our main results show that the impact of tax shocks on the macroeconomic
variables is asymmetric over the business cycle. Researchers disagree over the
(linear) eﬀects of a tax shock in the UK. For instance, Perotti (2005), relying
on the Blanchard and Perotti (2002) approach, ﬁnds that a tax cut has small
but recessionary eﬀects on output, opposite to the conventional wisdom. Cloyne
(2013), identifying the tax shock à la Romer and Romer (2010), ﬁnds the opposite
results: an unexpected decrease in taxes has positive and statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀects on output (2.15 over three years). We reconcile these diﬀerences consid-
ering the phase of the economy in which tax shock occurs. The diﬀerence of the
results across regimes (recessions and expansion) lies in the relative position of
the AD-AS curves. To rationalize these results we consider an AS curve which
is relatively ﬂat before the point of full employment level of national income,
and then it becomes almost vertical afterward. In expansions, the aggregate de-
mand curve is in the steeper part of the aggregate supply curve and the eﬀects
of tax shocks on output are small. Conversely, in recessions the aggregate de-
mand curve is in the ﬂatter part of the aggregate supply curve, and therefore the
variation of output to taxes is larger in recessions than in expansions. We show
that the eﬀects of such shocks are quantitatively diﬀerent than those predicted
by a linear framework. A linear estimation overshadows the eﬀects of tax shocks
across regimes because it works as an average of the two diﬀerent eﬀects. Our
results are important for a policy standpoint, calling for a tailored use of ﬁscal
policy instruments across the business cycle.
A battery of robustness checks, dealing with alternative speciﬁcations, con-
ﬁrms the asymmetric eﬀects of a tax shock on GDP and its components.
Our paper is closely related to studies on the UK economy, i.e. Perotti (2005),
Cloyne (2013), and Baum, Poplawski-Ribeiro, and Weber (2012). There are dif-
ferences between their contributions and ours in terms of identiﬁcation of tax
5The use of single-equation technique in a nonlinear framework has been also advocated by
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013a; 2013b; 2017), Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013),
Ramey and Zubairy (2018), Ben Zeev and Pappa (2017), Leduc and Wilson (2012) and others
as an simple alternative to the VARs.
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shocks and model speciﬁcations. First, Perotti (2005) relies on the Blanchard
and Perotti coeﬃcient restriction scheme, whereas we identify the tax shock via
narrative tax shock measure provided by Cloyne (2013). Cloyne (2013) stud-
ies the linear responses of macroeconomic variables tax shocks. Conversely, we
investigate the impact of tax shocks conditionally on the phase of the business
cycle the economy is when tax shocks occur. Second, Baum, Poplawski-Ribeiro,
and Weber (2012) study the eﬀects of tax shocks in a nonlinear speciﬁcation and
identifying the structural shock á la Blanchard and Perotti (2002). Diﬀerently,
we identify the tax shocks via the narrative measure proposed by Cloyne (2013),
and to estimate the eﬀects of tax shocks on output, but also on its components,
we rely on a nonlinear version of the Local Projection (Jordà, 2005) technique.
Our work contributes to growing empirical literature on the state-dependent
tax multipliers (i.e., Sims and Wolﬀ, 2018; Demirel, 2016; Eskandari, 2019).
Focusing on the US, such studies ﬁnd that output tax multipliers are procyclical
(higher in good times than in bad times). They show that the procyclicality of
output tax multipliers in the US is driven by the procyclicality of the investment.
Conversely, we ﬁnd that a tax cut in the UK is most stimulative in recessions
than in expansions. Moreover, the state-dependent reaction of the UK output is
mainly driven by the reaction of consumption, the bigger component of aggregate
demand. Thus, our results are in line with the results found by Tagkalakis (2008)
and Kaplan and Violante (2014).
Finally, our work is also related to existing wider empirical literature on tax
multipliers (i.e., Blanchard and Perotti, 2002; Barro and Redlick, 2011; Mount-
ford and Uhlig, 2009; Romer and Romer, 2010; Mertens and Ravn, 2014; Ghas-
sibe and Zanetti, 2019), and in particular to the one pioneered by Romer and
Romer (2010) based on the identiﬁcation of exogenous tax change via the narra-
tive approach (see, V. Ramey, 2019 for a recent survey).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
linear and nonlinear speciﬁcations. Section 3 reports the results from the lin-
ear and nonlinear estimations. Section 4 shows the robustness checks, whereas
section 5 concludes.
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2 Data deﬁnition and Methodology
2.1 Linear Model
We estimate the eﬀects of a tax shock on UK macroeconomic aggregates relying
on the Local Projection (LP) technique introduced by Jordà (2005). LP allows
us to project the value of the dependent variable shifted h periods ahead on the
information set available at time t. Thus, those projections are local to each
horizon.
Consider a h set of regressions for h = 0,1,2. . .H for each variable of interest,
X˜t+h:
X˜t+h = αh + ζh +BLh(L)yt−i + θLh
Cloyne
t + ut+h (1)
where α and ζ are the constant and the linear trend, BLh is the coeﬃcient
matrix at each horizon h and yt−i is the vector of control variables which include
i lags of variables that usually enter in a "ﬁscal" VAR, such as the log real per-
capita terms of the government spending, GDP and tax revenues.6 To avoid
the degree of freedom constraints due to lag length and dimension of covariate
vector on the maximum horizon h (Jordà, 2005), we opt for a parsimonious
speciﬁcation of yt−i which includes four lags for each variable, as in Auerbach
and Gorodnichenko (2013a).7 The tax shock variable (Cloynet ) in equation (1)
is the tax change measure proposed by Cloyne (2013). It is constructed via
the narrative approach proposed by Romer and Romer (2010) and allows to
separate exogenous components of tax changes from the endogenous ones (i.e.,
tax policy change not due to countercyclical concern versus these due as response
to the macroeconomic ﬂuctuations). In particular, Cloyne's tax shock measure
includes four categories of exogenous tax changes.8 Firstly, it includes "long-
6Diﬀerent model speciﬁcations have been proposed in the tax literature. For instance, Romer
and Romer (2010) regress the dependent variable (GDP) on the contemporaneous value and
12 lags of their tax measure. Cloyne (2013) includes 12 lags of his tax measure, as in Romer
and Romer (2010), but in an "augmented" VAR which includes the consumption, investment
and GDP equations, as in Mertens and Ravn (2014). Favero and Giavazzi (2012) include
only the contemporaneous value of the Romer and Romer (2010) tax shock in a VAR which
models, among variables, also the revenues one. Our speciﬁcation is very close to the one
in Favero and Giavazzi (2012). However, we address the issue of diﬀerent lag length of tax
shocks to be included in our speciﬁcation in the robustness check section.
7A speciﬁcation including four lags is quite standard in the SVARs estimated on quarterly
data.
8The source for revenue estimates are the Financial Statement and Budget reports and the
oﬃcial parliamentary records.
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run" economic reforms not aimed at oﬀsetting macroeconomic ﬂuctuations. The
second component is the "ideological" tax changes adopted for political reasons,
whereas the third one refers to the "external change" (for example, imposed from
court judgments or European directives). The fourth component is the "deﬁcit
consolidation" not driven by current movement in deﬁcit or as a consequence
of other macroeconomic shock but, for example, to anchor the Government's
credibility. The series is aggregated according the implementation date to avoid
contemporaneous endogeneity of tax revenue to GDP. The changes in revenues
are normalized by the GDP and expressed as percentage. Then, a change in
Cloyne's measure will reﬂect the forecast "full year" change in revenues in each
quarter. The fact of having an estimate of the unanticipated ﬁscal shock enables
us to employ a uniequational approach to compute dynamic responses of a given
macroeconomic variable of interest. In other words, we need not appeal to a
VAR framework to identify the eﬀects of an exogenous variations in taxes (for
a comparison between VAR and LP impulse responses, see Plagborg-Møller and
Wolf, 2019). The advantage of the uniequational approach is that it is less prone
to model misspeciﬁcation, hence - all else being equal - it reduces the risk of
producing biased impulse responses. For further discussions on this approach,
see Alesina, Favero, and Giavazzi (2014). The eﬀects of a tax change (Cloynet )
on each variables of interest (X˜t+h) are captured by parameter θLh in equation
(1). Thus, the IRFs are constructed as a sequence of estimated {θLh}20h=0. 9
The main advantage of this methodology for the tax multiplier estimations is
that it does not require that the left-hand side variables in equation (1) should be
speciﬁed in the same form as the right-hand side variables. This property allows
to deﬁne each dependent variable of interest X˜t+h as in Hall (2009), Barro and
Redlick (2011) and Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013). In particular, X˜t+h is
deﬁned as following:
X˜t+h ≈ (lnXt+h − lnXt−1) Xt−1
GDP t−1
(2)
where (lnXt+h − lnXt−1) refers to the accumulated change from time t-1 to
t+h, whereas the ratio Xt−1/GDP t−1 converts ex ante the percent change to
pound change at each point on time, as in Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013).
Thus, this speciﬁcation overcomes the problem of ex post conversion factors, and
avoid bias in the estimation of tax multipliers.
9Notice that the proxy of tax shock is scaled by the nominal GDP. It means that estimated
coeﬃcients θh have the familiar interpretation of tax multipliers.
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Jordà's method implies the serial correlation in the error terms. To account
for it, we computed conﬁdence intervals relying on the block bootstrap (Politis
and Romano, 1992).10 We rely on quarterly data spanning from 1955Q1-2009Q4.
The beginning of the period is motivated by the availability of the quarterly
data, whereas the end by the availability of the proxy for tax changes. Table 1
summarizes the variables used and their sources.
2.2 The Nonlinear Model
Are the eﬀects of a tax cut state-dependent? Following Auerbach and Gorod-
nichenko (2013a; 2013b; 2017) we study the nonlinear eﬀect of a ﬁscal shock
on variables of interest combining the LPs (Jordà, 2005) with smooth transition
regressions (Granger and Teräsvirta, 1994). The response of dependent variables
X˜t+1 to a tax shock is estimated by the following regression:
X˜t+h = ζh+F (zt−i)(αR,h+BR,h(L)yt−i+θR,h
Cloyne
t )+(1−F (zt−i))(αE,h+BE,h(L)yt−i+θE,hCloynet )+ut+h
(3)
where R stands for Recession and E for Expansion. Each variable of interest
X˜t+1 is projected on the same vector of covariates yt−i of the linear speciﬁcation,
and BR,h and BE,h refer to coeﬃcient matrices of the recessionary and expan-
sionary phase, respectively. The lagged variables in yt−i are used to control for
the history of the shock, as in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013a). We allow
all of the coeﬃcients to vary across the business cycle, except for the trend term.
The eﬀect of a tax shock on X˜t+h at horizon h is captured in recessions by θR,h,
whereas in expansions by θE,h.
As in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013a; 2013b; 2017), the transition of
X˜t+1 from one regime to another is governed by a logistic function that depends
on zt:
F (zt) =
exp(−γzt)
1 + exp(−γzt) , γ > 0, zt ∼ N(0, 1) (4)
The transition function in (4) is a monotonically increasing function of zt,
where F is a continuous transition function bounded between 0 and 1 and zt
10The procedure used implies: 1) run a regression at time t+h, obtain the estimators and cal-
culate the ﬁtted value and residuals; 2) resample a block of residuals (l) with replacement and
calculate the bootstrapped dependent variable; 3) run the regression with the bootstrapped
dependent variables and the original regressors; 4) repeat B-times by going back to 2). In
our linear and nonlinear estimation B=1,000 and l=10.
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is the transition variable. The slope parameter γ determines the smoothness
of the change between 0 (strong expansions) to 1 (strong recessions), and the
identiﬁcation restriction is that γ > 0. If γ → ∞ in (4), then equation (3)
becomes a two-regime switching regression model.
Before estimating equation (3) for each variable of interest X˜t+h, we formally
test for the presence of nonlinearities. Linearity is tested replacing the transition
variable F (zt−i) by the third order Taylor series approximation around γ = 0, as
suggested by Lukkonen, Saikkonen, and Teräsvirta (1988).
We test linearity as following:
Xt = wtβ
′
0 + (w˜tzt−i)
′β1 + (w˜tz2t−i)
′β2 + (w˜tz3t−i)
′β3 + ut (5)
where vector wt contains four lags of covariates (log-real GDP, government
spending, revenues) and the contemporaneous value of tax shock (Cloynet ). Test-
ing the null hypothesis of linearity versus nonlinearity is equivalent to perform
an LM (χ2) test of H
′
0 : βι = 0, ι= 1, 2, 3, against H
′
1: at least one βι 6= 0. We
perform the linearity test plugging in Xt the variable of interest and in zt−i each
potential transition variable, such as the lagged (t-i) standardized backward-
looking moving average (MA) over (j) quarter(s) of the output growth rate with
i ∈ I = 1, .., 5 and j ∈ J = 2, ...8. The choice of i is justiﬁed to avoid that
tax shocks may have some contemporaneous feedback on the state of economy.
Notice that all the transition variable candidates have been standardized to be
comparable. Table 2 reports the p-value (multiplied by 100) of linearity tests.
The tests suggest a clear rejection of the null hypothesis of linearity in favor of a
speciﬁc nonlinear speciﬁcation, such as the smooth transition one. We choose for
the variable of interest the transition variables MA(j) lagged at time t-i corre-
sponding to the smallest p-value (Teräsvirta, 1988). That because whether there
is a correct transition variable among the diﬀerent alternatives, the power of the
test is maximized against it. Table 2 highlights that the nonlinearity of the GDP,
consumption, investment, exports is governed by aMA(2) lagged at t-1, whereas
that one of import and government consumption by a MA(2) lagged at time t-5.
Then, we calibrate the smoothing parameters γ to match the probability of
being in recession obtained applying the BBQ algorithm on the logarithm of the
real GDP (more details in Appendix B). We deﬁne a recessionary regime a period
for which F (zt) ≥ 0.85 ≈ 0.15. It means that the economy spends about 15% of
the time in the recessionary state and 85% of the time in the expansionary one.11
11The values of γ are in line with estimates obtained regressing in a logit model the dummy
11
This implies setting γ = 1.7. Figure 1 plots Cloyne's tax change measure versus
the recessionary (shaded area) and expansionary phases,12 whereas ﬁgures 2 and
3 refer to the transition variable zt and transition function F (zt), respectively.
13
Notice that one important advantage of the LPs is that the impulse responses
incorporate the average transitions of the economy from one regime to another.
According to Ramey and Zubairy (2018), the estimated coeﬃcients in equation
(3) depend on the characteristic of the economy from time t to t+h, given the
initial conditions (the tax shock, the initial state of the economy, and the control
variables). Since the control variables in equation (3) do not change at each
horizon h, then the estimated coeﬃcients on the covariates capture the average
transition of the economy from one state to another occurring in the sample.
Also, the estimated coeﬃcients (θR,h and θE,h) on the 
Cloyne
t will reﬂect the ef-
fects of the tax shock on the future state of economy. For example, suppose
that a tax shock has negative eﬀects on output in recessions and positive in
expansions, and a tax shock occurs in an expansionary period bringing the econ-
omy in a recessionary one. Then, the estimated parameters θE,h will incorporate
the transition of the economy from the expansionary to the recessionary regime
changing its values from positive to negative.14
3 Results
3.1 Output Response
Figure 4 depicts the responses of GDP to an exogenous decrease in taxes equal
to 1% of GDP estimated via the linear and nonlinear speciﬁcations. Notice that
in the linear speciﬁcation the IRFs are constructed as a sequence of estimated
variables (R=1 and E=0) obtained by the BBQ algorithm on transition variables (results
available upon request).
12The correlation between the tax shock measure and F (zt) or (1− F (zt)) is equal to zero.
13In the transition function F (zt) (ﬁgure 3), the frequency of non-alterning points is high. It
depends on the characteristic of the transition variable zt. This is in line with Harding (2008)
which show that in the UK "the frequency of non-alterning points is four times higher than
the US". Of course, if zt has some non-alterning points, this characteristic will be ampliﬁed
in the transition function F (zt) in which those points are bounded between zero and one.
14Using a SVAR we can account for this feedback only through Generalised IRFs, as in
Caggiano, Castelnuovo, Colombo, and Nodari (2015). As noted by Owyang, Ramey, and
Zubairy (2013), the diﬀerence between GIRFs and LPIRFs is based on how the two IRFs ac-
count for this feedback: in the GIRFs using the response at time t-1 to estimate the response
at time t, whereas in LPs computing the average h-period-ahead value forecast given the
information set at time t. See Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013) for a careful discussion
and comparison between the GIRFs and the LPIRFs.
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{θLh}20h=0, whereas in recessions and expansions as a sequence of {θRh}20h=0 and
{θEh}20h=0 one, respectively. The blue lines denote the IRFs in expansions, the
red lines the ones in recessions, whereas the black line the reaction of output
estimated via the linear model.15 The ﬁrst column of ﬁgure 4 compares the
linear and state-dependent responses. For ease of comparison, we only report
the IRFs. The second and third column report the IRFs and the 16th and 84th
percentiles of the distribution of the responses at each horizon. The impulse
responses are expressed as percent changes of GDP.
Focusing on a linear estimation, an exogenous tax cut has a positive, statisti-
cally signiﬁcant, and persistent eﬀect on output. The GDP increases on impact
by 0.5% and peaks at 1.8%, 17 quarters after the initial shock, then slowly goes
back to its steady state. Turning to a recessionary regime, a change in taxes has
positive eﬀects on GDP. Following an unexpected tax cut, the output increases
on impact by 1.2% and the peak-level is around 5 and comes after two years, then
gradually returns to the steady-state. Conversely, in expansions the reaction of
output to tax shock is not statistically signiﬁcant for the ﬁrst sixteen quarters.
Our ﬁndings show that the eﬀect of tax shocks varies across the business cycle.
The linear IRFs highlight that a linear estimation overshadows the asymmetric
eﬀects of macroeconomic variables to tax shocks as it works averaging up the
two diﬀerent eﬀects across the business cycle. The linear estimation tends to
underestimate the real eﬀects of a tax shock, whereas it overestimates the ones
in expansions.
Overall, our results predict asymmetric eﬀects of tax shocks across the busi-
ness cycle. The results can be read through the lenses of the AD-AS model.
Suppose that the economy is producing at its full employment level of natural
income and the aggregate supply curve is ﬂat and becomes steeper and steeper
and vertical at this point. If the economy starts from its equilibrium level and
there is an expansionary phase, the aggregate demand shifts rightwards and the
impact on output will be small, since the aggregate supply is almost vertical.
The only eﬀect is on prices. If the economy is in expansions and the government
decreases taxes, the new aggregate demand curve will shift toward right yet in
an even more vertical part of the aggregate supply curve.
If the economy is in recession, the original aggregate demand shifts on the
left. In this case, the movement of the aggregate demand is happening in a point
of the aggregate demand that lies ﬂatter than the one considered before. Suppose
15See Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013a), note 6, for analytic comparison between the
LPIRFs and the conventional IRFs.
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the economy is in a recessionary phase and the government reduces taxes. This
causes a movement toward right of the aggregate demand curve and such shift will
aﬀect output stronger than before. The positive eﬀects on output of this policy
intervention will be in absolute value stronger than the same policy intervention
that happens during expansions. The diﬀerence between the two phases of the
economy (recessions and expansion) lies in the relative position of the AD-AS
curves. In expansions, the AD curve is in the steeper part of the AS curve and
the eﬀects on output are small. Conversely, in recessions the AD curve is in the
ﬂatter part of the AS curve, and therefore the
∣∣∆Y
∆T
∣∣Rec > ∣∣∆Y
∆T
∣∣Exp.
3.2 Transmission mechanism: output components
According to our baseline results, an exogenous tax cut has larger eﬀects (in ab-
solute value) on output in recessions than in expansions. Which variable drives
output ﬂuctuation? To answer this question, we deﬁne each component of GDP
(consumption, investment, export, import, and government consumption) as in
(2) and then we plug each of them in equation (1) and (3). Before estimating
equation (3), we formally test for the presence of nonlinearities for each depen-
dent variable. Table 2 conﬁrms that there is a clear rejection of linearity for each
component of output in favor of a speciﬁc nonlinear speciﬁcation, such as the
smooth transition regressions.
Figure 5 depicts the responses of GDP components to exogenous decrease
in taxes equal to 1% of GDP. Once again, in the linear speciﬁcation the IRFs
are constructed as a sequence of estimated {θLh}20h=0, whereas in recessions and
expansions as {θRh}20h=0 and {θEh}20h=0 one, respectively. The ﬁrst column of
ﬁgure 5 compares the linear and the state-dependent responses for each variable
of interest. The second and third column reports the IRFs for the recessionary
and expansionary case and the 16th and 84th percentiles of the distribution of
the responses of each variable at each horizon.
Focusing on the recessionary regime, an exogenous decrease in taxes has
positive eﬀects on output components. In particular, the impact response of
private consumption is positive (1%), hitting its peak value (4.5%) 8 quarters
after the shock occurs, then goes back to its steady-state. The investment (gross
ﬁxed capital formation) increases and reaches its peak at 1.3%. Tax shock is
found to aﬀect statistically and positively exports and imports. On impact,
imports increase by 0.3% and, after it peaks at around 1.7%, then gradually
goes back to zero. The response of government consumption in the ﬁrst three
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quarters is not statistically signiﬁcant. However, when it peaks at 1.2%, the
response becomes statistically signiﬁcant.
Next, we look at the response of macroeconomic aggregates to a tax shock
in expansions. An unexpected tax cut has not statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects
on consumption and investment for the ﬁrst twelve quarters. After this, the
reaction becomes positive and statistically signiﬁcant. Tax shock is found to not
aﬀect statistically the impact reaction of imports. Conversely, the reaction of
exports is statistically signiﬁcant and negative. Government consumption reacts
statistically signiﬁcant and negatively to a tax shock decreasing on impact by
−0.2% and, after reaching its trough at -1.1%, then gradually goes back to zero.
Turning to the linear estimation results, the private consumption increases
on impact by 0.6% hitting a peak of 2.1%, sixteen quarters after the shock oc-
curs. Afterward, consumption gradually returns to its steady-state. Investment
increases on impact by a small amount (0.1%) and hits the peak (0.5%) in the
4th quarter. Tax shock does not aﬀect exports in the short-run, whereas it has
positive and persistent eﬀects on imports. Our estimations predict a positive
reaction of government consumption, albeit small.
Statistical evidence in favor of state-dependent impulse responses. According
to our estimation, the eﬀects of tax shocks are state-dependent. To statistically
support our results, we test the diﬀerence between the reactions of macroeco-
nomic variables estimated under recessionary and expansionary regimes. The
empirical density of the diﬀerence between IRFs is based on 1,000 realizations of
such diﬀerences for each horizon h. Figure 6 plots the median of the diﬀerence
with the 16th and 84th percentile error bands for GDP and its components. If
the value of zero is not included in the 16th and 84th percentile error bands, then
there will be evidence of nonlinearity. Overall, ﬁgure 6 conﬁrms that the eﬀects
of tax shock in the UK are statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerent across the business
cycle.
These ﬁndings accord with the analysis of Tagkalakis (2008): since the frac-
tion of liquidity constrained households is likely to increase, the decrease in taxes
increases their disposable income. An expansionary ﬁscal policy increasing the
disposable income of households has positive wealth eﬀects, and therefore house-
holds consume more. Conversely, in expansions the positive eﬀect of a tax cut
is counteracted by a decrease in government consumption. It turns out that
the reaction of private consumption is not statistically signiﬁcant for the ﬁrst
12 quarters. With regard to output, the results have some similarities to con-
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sumption. In recessions, the shock increases output, but this eﬀect disappears
in expansions. Since in our sample consumption represents 57% of GDP, the
reaction of output is likely to be driven by the reaction of consumption. This
tendency also holds in expansions. Turning to investment, our results show that
a decrease in taxes has positive eﬀects, both in recessions and in expansions.
However, the dynamics are diﬀerent. In recessions, the eﬀect of tax changes
impact investment within two years the shock occurs, whereas in expansions af-
ter that period. The decrease in taxes increases the business proﬁts and the
investment ﬁnanced by those proﬁts. The response of imports and exports is
asymmetric across the business cycle. In recessions, imports strongly increase
likely because of the increase in income, and therefore in domestic demand for
foreign goods. The reaction of exports may depend on the exchange rate16 and
on external factors. Interestingly, exports decrease in expansions, whereas the
reaction of imports is not statistically signiﬁcant in recessions.
Interesting, also when we focus on components of GDP the linear estimation
overshadows the asymmetric eﬀects of macroeconomic variables to tax shocks as
it works averaging up the two diﬀerent eﬀects across the business cycle.
3.3 Tax Multipliers
How large are tax multipliers in the UK? Are tax multipliers state-dependent?
From columns (1) to (3) of table 3 reports the mean, the peak and the cumu-
lative tax multipliers for the recessionary, expansionary and linear case.17 Bold
16Notice that the UK has experimented diﬀerent exchange rate regimes in the postwar period.
Indeed, until 1972 it was part of the Bretton Woods system. From 1972 to 1990 it adopted
a semi-managed ﬂoating regime. From 1990 to 1992 the UK was part of the European
Exchange Rate Mechanism. From 1993 the UK has adopted a ﬂoating exchange rate regime.
Studying the reaction of the exchange rate to a tax shock is already in the agenda. However, it
suﬃces here to say that focusing on the subsample 1972-2009 -according to Ilzetzki, Mendoza,
and Végh (2013) can be considered a ﬂexible exchange rate regime- and adding among the
covariates the real exchange rate does not aﬀect the results.
17The mean is computed as 1H
H∑
h=1
∆X˜t+h, the peak as ∆X˜t+h maxh=1...H{∆X˜t+h}. The
cumulative multipliers is computed as
∑H
h=1∆X˜S,t+h∑H
h=1∆Y˜S,t+h
with S={L,R,E} and H=12. To obtain
the estimated θSh coeﬃcients of the variable in the denominator (tax revenues), we transform
the tax revenues series as in (2), plug it in equation (1) and (3) and we run h set of regressions.
After having obtained the distribution of the responses of the tax revenues, we compute the
tax multipliers dividing the sum of the distribution of the responses of each variable of
interest (θSh) until horizon H to the counterpart distribution of the responses of revenues
(θSh). The cumulative tax multipliers, last column in table 3, are negative since any tax cut
that increases output causes tax revenues to decrease. Multiplying the ratio of such change
(plus in the numerator and minus in the denominator), it translates in negative multipliers.
16
numbers indicate that multipliers are statistically signiﬁcant with the 16th and
84th percentile error bands.
The results show the eﬀects of tax shock are diﬀerent conditional on the
state of the economy. The multipliers in recessions are unequivocally larger in
absolute value than the multipliers associated with expansionary periods. In
recessions, all multipliers are always larger than one (in absolute value) and
statistically signiﬁcant. The peak multiplier is around 5 and it occurs at the
8th quarter. In expansions, output tax multipliers are close to zero and not
statistically signiﬁcant. Turning to the linear tax multipliers, results show that
the output tax multipliers work as an average between the estimated ones in
recessionary and expansionary times.
Statistical evidence in favor of state-dependent tax multipliers. According to
our estimation tax multipliers are state-dependent. To the best of our knowledge,
only Baum, Poplawski-Ribeiro, and Weber (2012) have studied the nonlinear
eﬀect of tax shock in the UK (via a Threshold VAR). They apply the Blanchard
and Perotti (2002) identiﬁcation strategy and ﬁnd an output multipliers below
0.4 (in absolute value) that are not statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerent across regimes
(positive output versus negative output).18
To statistically support whether tax multipliers are diﬀerent across regimes,
we test the diﬀerence between the multipliers estimated under recessionary and
expansionary regimes.19 If the value of zero is not included in the 16th and
84th percentile error bands (not reported in the table for sake of simplicity but
available upon request), then there will be evidence of state-dependent tax multi-
pliers. For ease of exposition, whether the multipliers are statistically signiﬁcant
diﬀerent in recessions and expansions, we set an asterisk on the coeﬃcient related
to the recessionary period in table 3. Overall, there are statistically evidences
that tax multipliers in UK are state-dependent.
Alternatively, as in Sims and Wolﬀ (2018), we can multiply by minus one to make multipliers
positive to easily compare those with the government spending multipliers.
18Baum, Poplawski-Ribeiro, and Weber (2012) identify the tax shock in two steps. First of all,
they eliminate from the tax revenue series the cases of revenues changes not related to ﬁscal
policy decisions (i.e., movement in commodity price and asset). To this aim, they compare
the IMF (2010) action-based measure with the cyclical adjusted primary balance (CAPB) and
whether the divergence between the two measures was large, then revenue changes unrelated
to ﬁscal policy decisions are removed from the revenue series. Doing that, the revenues series
reﬂects the change in output and ﬁscal policy decisions. Secondly, to identify a structural
tax shock unrelated to movement in output they apply the Blanchard and Perotti (2002)
procedure.
19The empirical density of the diﬀerence between multipliers is based on 1,000 realizations of
such diﬀerences for each horizon h.
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Thus, evaluating tax multipliers in a linear framework may lead to overesti-
mate the eﬀects of decreasing taxes in expansions and underestimated the ones
in recessions. Blanchard and Leigh (2013) highlight that for the recent reces-
sion the size of ﬁscal multipliers has been underestimated. We highlight that
macroeconomic conditions can aﬀect ﬁscal multiplier estimates.
Our results are related to the literature quantifying output tax multipliers.
The sign and the size of reaction of GDP estimated by the linear speciﬁcation
are in line with the ones found by the recent literature. For example, Cloyne
(2013) for the UK and Barro and Redlick (2011) and Romer and Romer (2010)
for the US ﬁnd that tax multipliers are negative and above one. However, we
estimate a peak tax multiplier in recessions around 5, twice larger than the UK
(linear) one estimated by Cloyne (2013), but close to the one estimated for the
US by Mountford and Uhlig (2009).
Interesting, when we rely on a nonlinear estimation output tax multipliers
are found to be qualitatively diﬀerent with respect to the growing literature
focusing on the US state-dependent tax multipliers. In particular, Sims and
Wolﬀ (2018) use a medium-scale dynamic stochastic equilibrium model to show
that tax multipliers in the US are procyclical. In other words, tax multipliers
are in absolute value larger in expansions than in recessions. Eskandari (2019)
and Demirel (2016) conﬁrm that tax multipliers are larger during times of low
employment than times of high employment. Notice that they focus on the
US and, as highlighted by the same authors, the procyclicality of output tax
multipliers in the US is driven by the procyclicality of the investment. Conversely,
we ﬁnd that the nonlinear eﬀects of a tax cut on the UK GDP are mainly driven
by the reaction of consumption, the bigger component of aggregate demand, that
is larger in recession than in expansions. Thus, our results are in line with the
results found by Tagkalakis (2008). He ﬁnds that show that during a recession the
fraction of liquidity constrained household increase and an expansionary ﬁscal
policy is more eﬀective in boosting private consumption in recessions than in
expansions. Moreover, Kaplan and Violante (2014) show that the prevalence of
what are known as hand-to-mouth consumers, who consume all of their income
in each period and whose numbers may be expected to rise in recessions, are able
to generate strong consumption responses to ﬁscal stimulus.
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4 Robustness checks
Our results highlight that the eﬀects of tax shock on the UK GDP are state-
dependent. In this section, we check the robustness of our ﬁndings.
Alternative measure of tax shocks. We have identiﬁed the tax shock
in equation (1) and (3) via the contemporaneous value of the Cloyne tax shock
(Cloynet ). This speciﬁcation is close to the Favero and Giavazzi (2012) one, given
that we also include in vector yt lagged values of revenues.
20 The reasons for this
speciﬁcation are twofold. Firstly, we treat Cloynet as an observable and exogenous
shock to revenues.21 Secondly, this speciﬁcation allows us to preserve degrees of
freedom given our sample size. Notice that we have extended the linear analysis
to the nonlinear one. Whether the inclusion of lagged values of the Cloyne may
be not problematic in terms of degree of freedom in the linear speciﬁcation, it
will be in the nonlinear one since the parameters to be estimated double.
As highlighted by Cloyne (2013), the majority of tax changes captured by
the narrative measure Cloynet are announced and implemented within the same
quarter. However, lagging the tax shock allows accounting for the possibility of a
partial revision to tax shocks. Another issue rises since tax shock is constructed
on the base of policymakers' intentions. For instance, policymakers may declare
that tax changes are made for a reason unrelated to movements in macroeconomic
variables, while in reality they are concerned about these. We tackle the two
above issues by regressing the Cloynet on its own 12 lags and on the covariates
that enter in vector yt. Then, we select the number of terms of the MA(p) process
by checking the statistical signiﬁcance of such terms. It turns out that p=4 is
the last signiﬁcant term of the process. Thus, we identify the tax shock via the
residual obtained regressing Cloynet on its own 4 lags and on the covariates that
enter in vector yt. In this way, we identify a residual tax shock purged from
the potential revision in tax changes and movements of some macroeconomic
variables. The correlation between the Cloynet and the alternative (residual) tax
20Romer and Romer (2010) study the eﬀect of a tax shock on the US GDP regressing the
GDP on the contemporaneous value and 12 lags of their tax measure. Favero and Giavazzi
(2012) add to the Romer and Romer (2010) speciﬁcation some ﬁscal variables. They show
that the truncated moving average representation of Romer and Romer (2010) shocks gives
biased estimates of the output reaction because of correlation between the Romer and Romer
(2010) shocks and distant lags of output and taxation. Because of that, they identify the
shock via the contemporaneous value of the Romer and Romer (2010) shock (exogenous term)
and treat it as the structural shock of one of the variables included in the VAR (revenues).
21Notice that correlation between the Cloynet and the lagged values of tax revenues, included
in vector yt, is low and range between 0.02 and 0.05.
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shock measure is 0.94. We plug such residual in equation (1) and (3) instead of
Cloynet , and we estimate them. Figure 7 plots the Cloyne tax measure (in our
notation Cloynet ) versus the alternative measures of tax shock identiﬁed by the
residual of the above exercise, whereas ﬁgure 8 and table 4 report the IRFs and
tax multipliers, respectively, from this exercise. The results are in line with the
ones obtained from our baseline model.
The Cloyne's measure used to identify tax shocks includes, among the sub-
categories, the tax shocks driven by "deﬁcit consolidation" (DC, henceforth)
motivations. As pointed out by Cloyne (2013), the "DC" subcategory is diﬀer-
ent from the Romer and Romer (2010) one. In Romer and Romer (2010), the
"DC" category is treaded as exogenous because it reﬂects past shocks, not re-
lated to macroeconomic conditions. For instance, it captures an increase in taxes
to reduce an inherited deﬁcit to long-run economic reasons. Conversely, Cloyne
(2013) notes that in the UK part of tax changes due to ﬁscal consolidation is
related to current macroeconomic conditions (endogenous). For that reason, the
"DC" in Cloyne (2013) is more restrictive than in Romer and Romer (2010) one
and, it includes only 12 observations. Once again, since tax shock is constructed
on the base of policymakers' intentions, we verify the robustness of our results
excluding from the Cloyne the DC subcategory. Figure 8 and table 4 include
the IRFs and tax multipliers from the above exercise showing that our baseline
results, both in the linear and nonlinear speciﬁcation, are not aﬀected.
Alternative speciﬁcation. Francis and Ramey (2009) and Owyang, Ramey,
and Zubairy (2013) highlight the importance of including a quadratic trend in
the US post-WWII period because of the slow-moving demographics. We address
this issue for the UK replacing the linear time trend in equation (1) and (3) with
the quadratic one. The results from this exercise is reported in ﬁgure 8 and table
4. Furthermore, to control for monetary policy actions we add to the control
vector yt of equation (1) and (3) the policy rate and the inﬂation.
22 Figure 9
and table 4 show that adding other variables to our baseline speciﬁcation, both
in the linear and nonlinear speciﬁcation, does not aﬀect our results.
Alternative values of the smoothness parameter. We calibrate the
smoothness parameter γ to match the frequencies of the UK recessions obtained
via the BBQ algorithm (see Appendix B), in our sample F (zt) ≥ 0.85 ≈ 0.15.
According to our metric, the UK economy spends 15% in recessions. To check
the sensitivity of our results to the alternative calibrations of the smoothness
22The inﬂation rate is the annualized Retail Price Index, since the Consumer Price Index is
not available from 1955.
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parameter, we (re)calibrate γ to include in our sample a number of recessions
ranging from 10% to 20%. The lower bound is set by the minimum amount of
observations each regime should contain (Hansen, 1999). Figure 8 and table 4
show that our results are robust to alternative calibrations of γ parameters.
Alternative indicators of states. In our baseline speciﬁcation, we discrim-
inate between recessions and expansions via the standardized backward-looking
moving average over 2 quarters of the real GDP growth rate. To verify the ro-
bustness of our results using alternative indicators of the economic cycle, we run
equation (3) plugging in zt−i the standardized deviation of: a) the growth rate
(moving average over 2 quarters) of the output from the HP-ﬁltered trend; b)
change in the unemployment rate from the HP-ﬁltered trend. To avoid smoothing
out deep recessions and strong expansions, we use a large value of the smoothing
parameter in the ﬁlter (λ=10,000,000).23
Figure 9 plot the IRFs of GDP, whereas table 4 reports the output multipliers
from the above exercises. The results are qualitatively in line with our baseline
results.
Controlling for anticipation and monetary policy regimes. To proxy
the exogenous tax changes, we rely on the narrative measure constructed by
Cloyne (2013) in which tax changes are aggregated on the base of the implemen-
tation date. In other words, it means agents react to tax changes when they
are implemented and not before. However, the implementation may occur later
than the announcement and agents may react to tax changes before the imple-
mentation. As highlighted by Cloyne (2013), the majority of tax changes in the
UK are announced and implemented on the same quarter. However, to address
the anticipation issue we proxy tax changes relying on the measure proposed by
Cloyne (2013) that includes only tax changes implemented within 90 days of the
announcement date. Moreover, the eﬀects of tax change may depend on diﬀer-
ent monetary regime regimes. In 1979 the incoming conservative Government
committed to reduce inﬂation. To this aim, the monetary policy was important.
To address the two above issues, we estimate a tax change surprise focusing
on a sample size spanning from 1979:II to 2009:IV. Figure 9 yields similar results
to our baseline.
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The Jordà method regresses
the dependent variable at horizon t+h on the shock in period t. To overcome
23Our results are robust using a smoothing weight equal to 1,000,000,000 as in Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko (2017). Results not shown here for the sake of brevity, but available upon
request.
21
the heteroskedasticity due to the successive leading of the dependent variable,
we constructed the conﬁdence intervals relying on the block bootstrap. However,
we address the potential concerns of heteroskedasticity computing the standard
errors for the impulse responses via the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
(HAC) consistent estimator (Newey and West, 1987). Figure 10 plots the IRFs
to a tax shock corresponding equal to 1% of GDP from the above exercise for
GDP and its components (private consumption, investments, exports, imports,
government consumption). All estimated responses are reported within plus
and minus 1-standard error bands, which is based on heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors (see Newey and West, 1987).
Our results are robust to the above exercise.
Overall, our results are robust to alternative speciﬁcations calling for a tai-
lored used of the ﬁscal policy tool across the business cycle.
5 Conclusions
We study the nonlinear eﬀects of an exogenous tax cut in the UK. The tax shock
is identiﬁed by the measure proposed by Cloyne (2013). We model nonlinear-
ity via the combination of local projection technique (Jordà, 2005) and smooth
transition regressions (Granger and Teräsvirta, 1994). We ﬁnd that the sign and
the size of tax multipliers on GDP and its components are asymmetric across the
business cycle. In recessions, a cut in taxes stimulates the economic activity and
the GDP ﬂuctuation is mainly driven by consumption. In expansions, output
and consumption do not respond to a tax shock in the short-run. The reason
can be found in the asymmetric reaction of government consumption across the
business cycle. Since in expansions government consumption reacts negatively
to tax shocks, it plays an important role in counteracting the (positive) eﬀect of
such shock on output and consumption.
Other studies in the literature, as Perotti (2005) and Cloyne (2013), ﬁnd
contrasting results: a positive tax shock has expansionary eﬀect (albeit close
to zero) in Perotti (2005), and contractionary one in Cloyne (2013). We recon-
cile these diﬀerences considering the state of the business cycles the economy is
when exogenous tax change occurs. Linear predictions of tax multipliers lead to
overestimate the beneﬁts of decreasing taxes in expansions and underestimated
the ones in expansions. The knowledge of how economic agents respond to tax
shocks over the business cycle is crucial for designing ﬁscal policy and to evaluate
22
the cost of ﬁscal measures.
The results documented in this paper lead to new research questions. First,
we have seen that following a tax shock the reaction of imports and exports is
diﬀerent according to the state of economy. It would be interesting to study
whether the UK tax shock has some (nonlinear) spillover eﬀects on its trade
partner countries. Second, we shed light that the state-dependent tax multipliers
may diﬀer among countries. It calls for future research to quantify the state-
dependent tax shock eﬀects in countries diﬀerent than the US.
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Table 1: Data Sources
Series Description Sources
GDP Real GDP ONS
Nominal GDP GDP in current prices ONS
Consumption Final household consumption expenditure ONS
Investment Gross ﬁxed capital formation ONS
Imports Trade in goods and services: Total imports ONS
Exports Trade in goods and services: Total exports ONS
Population UK total population Eurostat
Inﬂation Change in Retail Prices Index ONS
Interest rate Oﬃcial Bank rate Bank of England
Government consumption Government consumption of goods and services ONS
Tax revenues Total tax and NI receipts ONS
Cloyne's Tax Shocks Exogenous tax changes (Cloyne, 2013) AER's website
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Table 3: Output Tax Multipliers (baseline)
Multipliers
Average: Maximum: Cumulative
1
H
H∑
h=1
∆X˜t+h maxh=1...H{∆X˜t+h}
∑H
h=1∆X˜t+h∑H
h=1∆Y˜t+h
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline
Recession 2.55* 4.94* -2.51*
[2.19, 2.92] [3.48, 6.62] [-3.64, -1.78]
Expansion -0.05 0.58 -0.17
[-0.27, 0.14] [-0.43, 1.62] [-0.60, 1.03]
Linear 0.8 1.39 -1.79
[0.66, 0.95] [0.71-2.03] [-2.56, -1.30]
Output Tax Multipliers. Notes: the table shows the multipliers on output to a tax cut
corresponding to 1% of GDP. We report the average, the maximum and the cumulative output
tax multipliers, columns (1) to (3) respectively. The multipliers are calculated over twelve
quarters and in recessions, expansions, and in the linear case. Bold numbers mean that the
coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant at 68% conﬁdence intervals. Asterisks mean that the
coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerent across regimes (recessions versus expansions)
at the 68% level.
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Table 4: Robustness checks: Output Tax Multipliers
Multipliers
Average: Maximum: Cumulative
1
H
H∑
h=1
∆X˜t+h maxh=1...H{∆X˜t+h}
∑H
h=1∆X˜t+h∑H
h=1∆Y˜t+h
(1) (2) (3)
excluding DC
Recession 2.8* 5.52* -2.55*
Expansion -0.09 0.61 -0.27
Linear 0.84 1.15 -1.9
Residualt
Recession 2.19* 4.35* -3.1*
Expansion 0.15 0.9 -0.53
Linear 0.9 1.62 -2
quadratic trend
Recession 2.46* 4.7* -2.96*
Expansion -0.07 0.47 -0.31
Linear 0.75 1.21 -1.70
int.rate & inﬂ. rate
Recession 1.55* 4.32* -2.65*
Expansion 0.15 0.99 -0.41
Linear 0.69 1.15 -1.42
F (zt) ≥ 0.80 ≈ 0.20
Recession 2.63* 4.97* -2.51*
Expansion 0.05 0.64 -0.15
F (zt) ≥ 0.90 ≈ 0.10
Recession 2.5* 5* -2.40*
Expansion 0.12 0.54 0.36
detrended GDP growth rate
Recession 2.67* 5.03* -2.51*
Expansion -0.06 0.53 0.17
detrended change in unemployment rate
Recession 2.1* 5.1* -3.68*
Expansion -0.08 0.7 0.44
Notes: The table shows the multipliers on output to a tax cut corresponding to 1% of
GDP under alternative speciﬁcations. We report the average, the maximum and the cumula-
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tive output tax multipliers, columns (1) to (3) respectively. The multipliers are calculated over
twelve quarters and in recessions, expansions, and in the linear case. Bold numbers mean that
the coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant based on the 16th and 84th percentiles of empirical
distribution. Asterisks mean that the coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerent in reces-
sions versus expansions (at the 16th- 84th percentile range). Each block refers to an alternative
speciﬁcation of our baseline. From the top block to the bottom one: (i) excluding the deﬁcit
consolidation (DC) component from the overall tax shock measure; (ii) identiﬁcation of tax
shock via the residual tax shock; (iii) (re-)estimate the model including a quadratic trend
instead of the linear one; (vi) add to the control vector the monetary policy and inﬂation rate;
(v) (re)calibrate the probability of being in recessions equal to 10% and (vi) to 20%; (vii) rely
on the growth rate (moving average over 2 quarters) of the output from the HP-ﬁltered trend
as indicator of the business cycle; (viii) rely on the change in the unemployment rate from the
HP-ﬁltered trend as indicator of the business cycle.
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Figure 1: Tax shock vs Business cycle
Notes: The shaded area indicate the UK recessionary phases (1955:I-2009:IV) identiﬁed by
applying the BBQ algorithm, whereas the red lines refers to the tax shock measure of Cloyne
(2013).
Figure 2: Transition variable versus Business Cycle Dates
 
Notes: the transition variable is the standardized backward-looking moving average con-
structed with two realizations of the quarter-on-quarter real GDP growth rate. Shaded area
refers to the recessionary phase identiﬁed applying the BBQ algorithm (Harding and Pagan,
2002)
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Figure 3: Probability of being in a recessionary phase
 
Notes: F (zt) computed according to the logistic function presented in the text. The
transition variable is the standardized backward-looking moving average constructed with two
realizations of the quarter-on-quarter real GDP growth rate. The value of the slope parameter
is 1.7.
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Figure 4: Response of GDP to 1 percent of GDP cut in taxes
Notes: Figure plots the impulse responses of output to a cut of taxes equal to 1% of GDP.
The blue lines denote the IRFs in expansions, the red lines the ones in recessions, whereas the
black line the reaction of output estimated via the linear model. The ﬁrst column of the ﬁgure
reports the linear and the state-dependent responses. The second and third column report the
IRFs for the recessionary and expansionary case, respectively, and the 16th and 84th percentiles
of the distribution of the responses at each horizon. The impulse responses are expressed as
percent change of GDP. Horizontal axes represent quarters.
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Figure 5: Response of GDP components to 1 percent of GDP cut in taxes
Notes: Figure plots the impulse responses of consumption (row I), investment (row II),
exports (row III), imports (row IV), and government consumption (row V) to a cut of taxes
equal to 1% of GDP. The blue lines denote the IRFs in expansions, the red lines the ones in
recessions, whereas the black lines the reaction of output estimated via the linear model. The
ﬁrst column of the ﬁgure reports the linear and the state-dependent responses. The second
and third column report the IRFs for the recessionary and expansionary case, respectively,
and the 16th and 84th percentiles of the distribution of the responses at each horizon. The
impulse responses are expressed as percent change of GDP. Horizontal axes represent quarters.
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Figure 6: Diﬀerences in Impulse Responses of GDP and its components to a tax
cut
Notes: Figure plots the median realizations of the diﬀerences between impulse responses
in recessions and expansions to 1 percent of GDP cut in taxes for consumption, investment,
exports, imports, government consumption and GDP. Shaded bands refer to the 16th and 84th
percentiles of the distribution of the diﬀerence at each horizon. (shaded bands). Horizontal
axes represent quarters.
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Figure 7: Cloyne shocks and its exogeneity
Notes: Figure plots the tax shock series constructed by Cloyne (2013), in our notation
Cloynet , versus the (residual) tax shock series obtained regressing the 
Cloyne
t on its own four
lags and four lags of the log real GDP, revenues and government consumption.
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Figure 8: Response of GDP to 1 percent of GDP cut in taxes (alternative speci-
ﬁcations)
Notes: Figure plots the state-dependent impulse responses of output to a cut of taxes equal
to 1% of GDP under alternative speciﬁcations. The column on the left reports the IRFs for
the recessionary case, whereas the column on the right plots the IRFs for the expansionary
one. Each row refers to an alternative speciﬁcation of our baseline. For each speciﬁcation, the
ﬁgure shows the IRFs from the baseline speciﬁcation and the 16th and 84th percentiles of the
distribution (shaded bands) against the IRFs from the alternative speciﬁcation (black dotted
lines). From the top to the bottom: (i) (re)calibrate the probability of being in recessions
equal to 10% and (ii) to 20%; (iii) (re-)estimate the model including a quadratic trend instead
of the linear one; (iv) identiﬁcation of tax shock via the residual tax shock; (v) excluding the
deﬁcit consolidation (DC) component from the overall tax shock measure.
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Figure 9: Response of GDP to 1 percent of GDP cut in taxes (alternative speci-
ﬁcations, cont'd)
Notes: Figure plots the state-dependent impulse responses of output to a cut of taxes equal
to 1% of GDP under alternative speciﬁcations. The column on the left reports the IRFs for
the recessionary case, whereas the column on the right plots the IRFs for the expansionary
one. Each row refers to an alternative speciﬁcation of our baseline. For each speciﬁcation, the
ﬁgure shows the IRFs from the baseline speciﬁcation and the 16th and 84th percentiles of the
distribution (shaded bands) against the IRFs from the alternative speciﬁcation (black dotted
lines). From the top to the bottom: (i) add to the control vector the monetary policy and
inﬂation rate; (ii) rely on the growth rate (moving average over 2 quarters) of the output from
the HP-ﬁltered trend as indicator of the business cycle; (iii) rely on the change in the unem-
ployment rate from the HP-ﬁltered trend as indicator of the business cycle; (iv) controlling for
anticipation and monetary policy regimes.
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Figure 10: Response of GDP and its components to 1 percent of GDP cut in
taxes (HAC standard errors)
Notes: The ﬁgure plots the impulse responses of private consumption, investments, ex-
ports, imports, government consumption and output to a tax shock corresponding equal to 1%
of GDP. All estimated responses are reported within plus and minus 1-standard error bands,
which is based on heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors (see
Newey and West, 1987).
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A Appendix
Output Elasticity of Revenues and conversion factors of elasticity into
multiplier: Do they matter for the Tax Multiplier?
The main challenge in estimating the tax multiplier is to disentangle a tax
change due to a discretionary ﬁscal policy from a nondiscretionary component,
e.g. the change in taxes due to a change in output. Two methods have been
proposed in the literature. The ﬁrst one relies on the SVAR model and based
mainly on the identiﬁcation assumption scheme pioneered by Blanchard and Per-
otti (2002). The second one identiﬁes an exogenous tax change using a narrative
method (Romer and Romer, 2010; Mertens and Ravn, 2014; Cloyne, 2013). De-
spite several studies investigating tax multipliers, there is not a shared view.
Perotti (2005), identifying a tax shock via coeﬃcient restrictions, ﬁnds that fol-
lowing a tax shock the UK GDP decrease. Cloyne (2013) identify a tax shock
through the narrative approach and ﬁnds that a tax cut stimulates the economy.
In general, the size and duration of a tax shock vary across studies and the es-
timated tax multiplier via a SVAR model tends to be lower than the narrative
approach.
Caldara and Kamps (2008) show that contrasting US ﬁscal multiplier esti-
mations are likely due to diﬀerent assumptions on the size of the elasticity of tax
revenues to GDP. The ﬁrst question addressed in this section is whether the UK
output tax multiplier is "output elasticity of taxes dependent". To do that we
employ in very basic (linear) SVARs two measures of the UK automatic stabilizer
proposed in the literature by Perotti (2005) and Cloyne (2013).
Consider a simple three-variate VAR as in Blanchard and Perotti (2002)24 of
the form:
Xt = C(L)Xt−1 + ut t = 1, ..., T (A.1)
whereXt includes four lags of the log real per capita government consumption,
tax revenues and GDP and ut is a three-dimensional vector of residuals. Equation
(A.1) includes also a constant and a linear time trend. Following the approach
24Notice that Perotti (2005) estimates for the UK a ﬁve-variable VAR. Caldara and Kamps
(2008) show that diﬀerent results in the literature about the US ﬁscal multipliers are not due
to diﬀerence in the speciﬁcation of the reduced-form models but to the diﬀerent identiﬁcation
strategies. We stress that the exercise provided in this section is not aimed at choosing the
best speciﬁcation for our analysis but to understand whether the Caldara and Kamps' result
is valid also for the UK economy. Hence, we estimate a more parsimonious VAR, as in
Blanchard and Perotti (2002).
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proposed by Perotti (2005), the reduced form innovations of vector ut is expressed
as a linear combination of the structural shocks such that:
uGt = α
G
Y u
Y
t + β
G
T 
T
t + 
G
t (A.2)
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Since the aim is estimating the eﬀect of a tax shock Tt on the GDP, let us fo-
cus on equation (A.3). It states that unexpected movement in taxes at time t
may be due to output innovations (uYt ), structural shocks to government con-
sumption (Gt ) or to taxes (
T
t ) . Hence, the coeﬃcients α
i
j capture the elasticity
of variable i to the variable j, while coeﬃcients βij capture possible link be-
tween structural shocks to ﬁscal variable which may arise whether, for instance,
government consumption instantaneously responds to revenues change with gov-
ernment consumption adjustment. The identiﬁcation of a tax shock is based on
the Aut=Bt scheme and on some restrictions on the matrix A and B to map
from innovations uTt to the structural shocks 
T
t . Expressed in matrix notation: 1 0 −α
G
Y
0 1 −αTY
−αGY −αYT 1

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G
t
uTt
uYt
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G βGT 0
βTG σ
T 0
0 0 σY
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 
G
t
Tt
Yt
 (A.5)
The identiﬁcation of ﬁscal shock in Blanchard and Perotti (2002) relies on
some assumptions about the reaction lags and the structural elasticity. Suppose
that there is a negative output shock. To oﬀset such shock a ﬁscal policy action
should be planned, approved by the House of Commons and then implemented.
It should take more than one quarter to apply a discretionary ﬁscal policy. With
quarterly data, the contemporaneous response of the government spending to
an output shock can be set to zero. Also, the implementation lags imply that
coeﬃcient αTY captures only the automatic elasticity of the tax revenues to GDP
due to a ﬂuctuation in the tax base. Thus, the cyclically-adjusted tax innovation,
uCATt , is given by the diﬀerence between the tax innovation (u
T
t ) and the output
elasticity of revenues (αTY ). Notice that the restricted value of the coeﬃcient
αTY is obtained by an out-of-model information.
25 Hence, the cyclical adjusted
25Perotti (2005) calibrates the value of the automatic stabilizer for the UK economy through
the OECD method and assumptions proposed by Giorno, Richardson, Roseveare, and van
den Noord (1995) and van den Noord (2002). The output elasticity of output is calibrated
43
tax innovation derives from an instrumental variable estimation. The structural
shock Tt is recovered imposing a recursive order on matrix A, on which we
assume that tax shock "comes ﬁrst" than government spending one. Thus, we
set βTG=0.
26
Estimated impulse response functions obtained via the estimation of (A.5)
allow us to address a second problem, the ex post conversion factor's, raised by
Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013). It is related to the estimation of ﬁscal
multipliers. In general, it is common practice in the ﬁscal multiplier literature
to run SVARs using log-transformed variables, and then to convert estimated
elasticities into multipliers via (ex post) conversion factors, e.g. the average of
the ratio GDP/(ﬁscal variable). However, Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013)
highlight that diﬀerent sample size may rend diﬀerent conversion factor values,
which may lead to biased ﬁscal multiplier estimates.
Output Elasticity of Revenues and conversion factors of elasticity into mul-
tiplier: Do they matter for the Tax Multiplier? This paper address the two
problems through simple exercises. We consider two sample sizes spanning one
from 1963:I to 2001:II, and the other one from 1955:I to 2009:IV. For each sample
size, we estimate two SVARs including the quarterly log of the real government
consumption, tax revenues, and GDP,27and imposing the implementation lag
coeﬃcient restrictions discussed above. Notice that for each sample size two al-
ternative coeﬃcient restrictions of output elasticity of taxes (αTY ) are set. On
the one hand, we set αTY=0.76 as in Perotti (2005). On the other hand, we ﬁx
αTY=1.61 as estimated by Cloyne (2013) using narrative data on tax changes.
28
To obtain tax multipliers from (four) estimated SVARs, we convert estimated
elasticities (since our variables are expressed in logarithm terms) into multipliers
via ex post conversion factors. For each sample size and value of αTY , we convert
the elasticity into multipliers using the minimum, the mean and the maximum
value of the average of the ratio GDP/T of the sample size under analysis.29 The
combining the estimation of elasticity of tax revenues to their tax base with the elasticity of
tax base to output. Corporate and indirect taxes is equal to 1 by assumption. Moreover, the
computation of the automatic stabilizer excludes output elasticity to GDP cyclical eﬀects on
tax expenditure, income of self-employed, capital gains, for example. See Perotti (2005) and
Mertens and Ravn (2014) in-depth analysis.
26Our results are robust to the alternative speciﬁcation that government spending "comes ﬁrst"
than tax shock. The results are available upon request.
27All SVARs are estimated including a constant and a linear time trend.
28The exercises on two samples are justiﬁed because the Perotti's output elasticity of taxes is
calibrated for the period 1963:I to 2001:II, whereas the estimation of Cloyne is related to the
sample 1955:I-2009:IV.
29For the sample size 1963:I-2001:II the mean, minimum and maximum of the ratio GDP/T
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90% conﬁdence intervals are computed using 10,000 bootstrapped replications.
Figure A.1 depicts the IRFs. The top panels show the response of output to
a tax shock for the period 1963:I to 2001:II, whereas the bottom ones for the
period spanning from 1955:I to 2009:IV. The left-hand side panels depict the
results for the two diﬀerent samples when αTY = 0.76 (Perotti), whereas the right
ones when αTY = 1.61 (Cloyne). Each plot reports the point estimates multiplied
by diﬀerent conversion factors: the mean (blue line), the minimum (red line),
and the maximum (dotted red line). Figure A.1 shows that, for each sample size,
increasing the value of αTY the expansionary eﬀects of a cut in taxes on output in-
crease. Moreover, the value of αTY has an impact on the persistence of the shock.
That is evident whether we consider table A.1 which reports the cumulative mul-
tipliers, for diﬀerent sample sizes, coeﬃcient restrictions, and conversion factors.
Let us focus on the sample size A (1963:I -2001:II) and on the row reporting tax
multipliers using as conversion factor the mean of GDP/T, mean (A). The esti-
mated 1-year integral multiplier (4Q) is −0.3 setting αTY = 0.76, whereas doubles
setting αTY = 1.61. Moreover, the value of α
T
Y has eﬀects on the persistence of
the shock. Indeed, whereas the 2-year integral multiplier (8Q) tax multiplier is
not statistically signiﬁcant for αTY = 0.76, it is for α
T
Y = 1.61. Turning on panel
B, the 1-year integral tax multiplier (4Q) is statistically signiﬁcant only when
αTY = 1.61. Further, using a diﬀerent value of conversion factors aﬀects the size
of output tax multipliers. For example, this bias is evidence focusing on the
2-year integral multipliers (8Q) of panel A, for which tax multipliers range below
and above one.
The results show that using the same dataset, the same estimation's method
but diﬀerent coeﬃcient restrictions on the output stabilizer yield diﬀerent results.
This is consistent with Caldara and Kamps (2008): the ﬁscal multipliers change
according to the calibration of the output elasticity of taxes. Moreover, the
combination of coeﬃcient restrictions with the value of ex post conversion factors
may lead to other bias on tax multiplier estimates.
An exogenous tax change measure based on the narrative method does not
require imposing restrictions on the output elasticity of taxes. A solution to avoid
ex post conversion problem is to convert GDP and taxes to the same units ex
ante the estimation. Hence, we identify the tax shock via the tax shock measure
proposed by proposed by Cloyne (2013), and to avoid bias on tax multipliers we
transform the variables as in Hall (2009), Barro and Redlick (2011) and Owyang,
are 3.19, 2.83 and 3.9, respectively. Regard to the sample size 1955:I to 2009:IV, the mean,
minimum and maximum of the above ratio are 3.25, 2.83 and 4.02, respectively.
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Ramey, and Zubairy (2013).
Figure A.1: Perotti and Cloyne's output elasticity of revenues in a SVAR speci-
ﬁcation
Notes: Top panels show the response of output to a tax shock for the period 1963:I to
2001:II, whereas the bottom panels the one for the period 1955:I-2009:IV. The left panels refer
to the case in which the output elasticity is set to 0.76 Perotti (2005), whereas the right ones
refer to an automatic stabilizer set to 1.61 Cloyne (2013). The blue, red and dotted red lines
depict the IRFs obtained using as ex post conversion factor the average, the minimum and the
maximum of the ratio of GDP to revenues, respectively.
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Table A.1: Multipliers estimated relying on diﬀerent sample size, coeﬃcient re-
strictions, and conversion factors
Sample size CF Perotti (αTY = 0.76) Cloyne (α
T
Y = 1.61)
4Q 8Q 4Q 8Q
(A) 1963:I-2001:II min (A) -0.22 −0.39 -0.56 -0.88
mean (A) -0.30 −0.44 -0.62 -1.00
max (A) -0.37 −0.55 -0.79 -1.24
(B) 1955:I-2009:IV min (B) −0.06 0.05 -0.40 −0.59
mean (B) −0.07 0.06 -0.48 −0.67
max (B) −0.09 0.07 -0.60 −0.83
Notes: Top rows show the response of output to a tax shock for the period 1963:I to 2001:II,
whereas the bottom rows the one for the period 1955:I-2009:IV. The left column refers to the
case in which the output elasticity is set to 0.76 Perotti (2005), whereas the right ones refers
to an automatic stabilizer set to 1.61 Cloyne (2013). Bold numbers indicate the coeﬃcients
statistically signiﬁcant at 90%.
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B Appendix
Business cycle identiﬁcation via BQQ
There is not in the UK an oﬃcial dating Committee, as the NBER, which has
established an expansion and recession chronology and which has been recognized
as an authoritative dating of the cycle.30 The NBER (2001) deﬁnes a recession
as "a signiﬁcant decline in activity spread across the economy, lasting more
than few months, visible in industrial production, employment, real income, and
wholesale-retail trade. A recession begins just after the economy reaches a peak of
activity and ends as the economy reaches its trough". According to the literature,
turning points can be deﬁned in terms of the absolute decline in output (classical
cycle) or in terms of deviation of GDP growth rate from its trend (deviation
cycle). The deviation-from-trend approach, as in Cooley and Prescott (1995)
and Stock and Watson (2008), requires detrending a series. However, several
detrending methods exist. For example, the NBER uses the phase-average trend
method (PAT), the macroeconomists use Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter or the "band
pass" to remove deterministic/stochastic trend. According to Canova (1998)
the identiﬁed business cycle may depend on the ﬁlter used. Moreover, Harding
and Pagan (2002) highlight that smoothing methods are aimed at simplifying
turning point identiﬁcation removing idiosyncratic variation. Thus, if turning
points are detected using quarterly data series the utility of smoothing methods
decreases with such frequency data. Hence, we identify turning points relying on
the classical cycle approach. We use the dating algorithm proposed by Harding
and Pagan (2002) which is the quarterly version of the well-known monthly Bry
and Boschan (1971) algorithm.31
The BBQ algorithm isolates local minimum and maximum points in a quar-
terly series, via some constraints. First of all, a local peak (trough) occurs at
time t when
yt > (<)yt±k (B.1)
where k=1,2,..K. K allows yt to be a local local peak (trough) to two quar-
30In 2002 CEPR established a Business Cycle Dating Committee for the euro area.
31The BBQ is one of the most widespread algorithms in detecting turning points. For example,
Artis, Marcellino, and Proietti (2002) rely on the BBQ to analyze the characteristic of the
business cycle. However, there are other algorithms that we may use to date turning points,
for example a Markov Switching model Hamilton (1998). As pointed out by Harding and
Pagan (2002) the Markov Switching model depends on the relative statistical framework.
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ters on either side.32 Secondly, the phases alternate between peak and trough.
This because whether the phases alternate, then it is possible to distinguish the
phase of recession (from peak to trough) from the expansion one (from trough to
peak).33 Thirdly, a complete cycle (from peak to peak or from trough to trough)
lasts at least n quarters. The last two rules are known as censoring rules.
To verify the validity of the BBQ a natural exercise is to apply the algorithm
to the US for which exists an oﬃcial chronology. We set for the US k=2 and the
duration of the complete cycle to ﬁve quarters, as in Harding and Pagan (2002),
and we apply the algorithm to the log-real GDP. Then, the turning points are
compared with the NBER data. Figure B.1 plots the NBER turning points (red
lines) versus the turning point identiﬁed by the BBQ ones (shaded area).
Figure B.1: US Business Cycle Chronology (NBER vs BBQ algorithm)
Notes: The shaded area indicate the recession phases identiﬁed by the BBQ algorithm,
whereas the red lines show the NBER business cycle chronology. The sample size spans from
1955:I to 2009:IV
From 1955 to 2009 the NBER has recorded 9 recessions, whereas the algo-
rithm does not capture the turning points of 2001. Stock and Watson (2010)
32Notice that larger is the value of K the more restrictive is the deﬁnition of the turning points
(Harding, 2008).
33Harding (2008) show that in the UK the frequency of non-alternating turning points is four
times higher than the US
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report that the NBER committee for dating relies on the quarterly real GDP
and on four monthly variables, such as real personal income less transfer, real
manufacturing, wholesale retail trade sales, industrial production, and nonfarm
employment. They highlight that those series do not receive the same weight
in the dating procedure. Moreover, Harding (2003) shows that the procedure
and variables used by the NBER for the business cycle chronology have changed
over time. Also, Harding (2008) report that in detecting the turning points the
NBER uses not only the committee's procedure but also a voting procedure that
can complicate the perfect matching of the BBQ dating turning points with the
NBER one. Thus, some diﬀerences between the two procedures may be due to
such reasons. Apart of the turning point of 2001 that is not captured because it
does not exhibit two quarters of negative growth (Harding, 2008) and keeping in
mind the above problems, our exercise reproduces the turning points from the
NBER. Overall, the BBQ algorithm performs well on the US. After having run
the above test, we apply the BBQ algorithm to the UK.
Figure B.2: UK Turning Points
Notes: The shaded area indicate the UK recession phases (1955:I-2009:IV) identiﬁed by
the application of the BBQ algorithm on the log-real UK GDP (red line).
We apply the BBQ algorithm to log-real GDP and we set k=2 and ﬁx the
duration of the business cycle to four quarters diﬀerently from the US exercise.
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This because Harding and Pagan (2002) ﬁnd diﬃculties to identify for the UK
the strong downturn of 1974 with a complete cycle of ﬁve quarters. The reces-
sion of 1974 was characterized by a complete cycle of 4. Hence, for the UK a
duration of the complete cycle of four can be applied. Figure B.2 shows the
identiﬁed turning points for the UK via the application of BBQ algorithm to the
log-real GDP. From 1955 to 2009 we identify seven recessions. The number of
UK recessions identiﬁed via the BBQ matches that ones reported from the Bank
of England in the Inﬂation Report (Bank of England (2014)). The only excep-
tion concerns the recessions of the 1970s that are treated as a single recession
by the Bank of England. The turning points identiﬁed by the BBQ algorithm
is going to be used as benchmark for studying the state-dependent tax multiplier.
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